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Abstract
E-waste is the fastest growing waste stream. Due to its potential economic
value as well as its possible negative impacts on the environment, tracing
e-waste flow is a major concern for stakeholders of e-waste management. Es-
pecially, whether or not adequate amounts of electrical and electronic equip-
ment waste (WEEE) flow into the designed recycling systems is a fundamen-
tal issue for sustainable operations. In this paper, we analyze how technical,
market, and legislative factors influence the total amount of e-waste that is
collected, recycled, exported and (legally and illegally) disposed of. We for-
mulate the e-waste network flow model as a variational inequality problem.
The results of the numerical examples highlight the importance of considering
the interaction between the supply and the demand side for precious mate-
rials in policy-decisions. Low collection rates of e-waste lead to low profits
for stakeholders and make it difficult to establish sustainable recycling opera-
tions. Increasing WEEE collection rates increases recyclers’ profits; however,
it only increases smelters’ profits up to a certain limit, after which smelters
cannot benefit further due to limited demand for precious materials. Fur-
thermore, the results emphasize the importance of establishing international
control regimes for WEEE flows and reveal possible negative consequences
of the recent trend of dematerialization. More precisely, product dematerial-
ization tends to decrease recyclers’ and smelters’ profits as well as to increase
the outflow of e-waste from the designated recycling system.
1 Introduction
Electrical and electronic equipment waste (WEEE) is the fastest growing
waste stream. In the EU alone, WEEE has been growing at a rate of 3-5%
per year, about three times faster than average waste. 90% of this waste
is still landfilled or incinerated, which not only damages the environment
but also poses health risks to society (Savage, 2006). WEEE recycling and
its management have unique associated challenges since WEEE is usually
a composition of several materials, including hazardous ones, such as, for
example, mercury, sulfur, and cadmium and precious ones, such as iron,
copper, gold and nickel (Sodhi and Reimer, 2001).
The establishment of sound collection systems for WEEE is of high pri-
ority in many countries. Increasing the efficiency of collection and recycling
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systems leading to a reduction in stockpiling by households, discarding in
landfills, incineration, and illegal exports is one of the pillars of the raw
material initiative of the European Union (European Commission, 2010).
A similar government movement concerning precious metal recovery from
WEEE can be observed in Japan (The Nikkei American Edition, 2010b) and
the U.S. (The New York Times, 2010).
The Ontario Electronic Stewardship (OES), for example, gathered only
one-third of the targeted WEEE of 42,000 tons in its first year although
it pays recyclers $235 per ton of WEEE. OES suspects that many of the
collected WEEE from end-users are exported to developing countries that
lack appropriate treatment facilities for WEEE (Torstar News Service, 2010).
In the EU, only 30 percent of the region’s e-waste, mostly parts without value,
flowed through registered collection and recycling organizations (Shao and
Lee, 2009). In China, WEEE collection programs in Qingdao and Zhejiang
are finding it difficult to control WEEE flows into the informal sector that
commits illegal dumping and/or inappropriate treatment (Hicks et al., 2005).
Legislative (assessing penalties for illegal dumping and minimum collec-
tion rates), market (WEEE supply and raw material demand), and technical
factors (the sorting and recycling capabilities and the percentage of haz-
ardous and precious materials in products) influence the flow of WEEE. The
effects of the interaction among these factors are still largely unknown which
makes it difficult to make policy recommendations. In this paper, we seek to
answer the following research questions:
• How do legislative, market, and technical factors impact the total
amount of waste that is collected, recycled and (legally and illegally)
disposed of?
• How do legislative, market, and technical factors impact the profits of
the stakeholders involved in the recycling process?
• How can policy-makers use this knowledge to design efficient and sus-
tainable reverse logistics systems?
The results of the numerical examples emphasize the importance of an
adequate supply of recycled products and demand for precious materials.
Existing conflicts of interest between recyclers and smelters are shown. Fur-
thermore, the results highlight possible negative consequences of the recent
trend of dematerialization.
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The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In section 2, we
provide a description of factors influencing WEEE flows. In section 3, we
provide an overview of the related literature. Section 4 develops the ana-
lytical framework used in the paper. In section 5, we present the numerical
analysis and discuss managerial insights. Section 6 summarizes our results
and presents future research questions.
2 Factors Influencing WEEE Flows
Based on a literature review of papers dealing with reverse logistics, Rahman
and Subramanian (2012) identified eight factors for end-of-life computer re-
cycling operations. Lindhqvist (2000) noted that administrative instruments
(e.g., regulations related to recycling, reuse, and disposal) and economic in-
struments (e.g., tax and/or subsidy and disposal fee systems) are important
drivers for a sustainable economy. Hosoda (2008) argued that technical con-
ditions, legal conditions, and market conditions are key drivers for designing
a material circulation society. In line with these studies, we group the factors
into three groups: legislative, market, and technical factors.
In this paper, we develop a network equilibrium model which allows us to
simultaneously evaluate impacts of legislative, market, and technical factors
on e-waste flows, prices, and profits of decision-makers as Figure 1 shows.
Furthermore, it enables us to explicitly consider effects of competition be-
tween multiple stakeholders at multiple tiers of the network on e-waste flows.
A variational inequality formulation allows us to apply algorithms for solv-
ing the complex general equilibrium problem, as well as to concisely address
stakeholders’ decision problems.
Legislative Factors
Many past studies (e.g., Rahman and Subramanian, 2012) determine that
legislation is one of the most important driving forces for successful reverse
supply chains. Legislative factors include penalties for illegal dumping, im-
port/export duties and restrictions. The EU enacted Directive 2002/96/EC
together with Directive 2002/95/EC to restrict the use of certain hazardous
substances in electrical and electronic equipment (RoHS). Similar legislation
or regulations are being implemented or planned in other countries includ-
ing Japan, Canada, the US, and China (Toyasaki et al., 2011). Controlling
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Figure 1: Impacts of legislative, market, and technical factors on WEEE
flows
transboundary WEEE flows is a major interest to legislators for reducing
environmental damages. However, a strict control of transboundary WEEE
flows plays an obstructive factor for international circulation of recyclable
materials, and, consequently, results in increased reliance on natural resource
development. For example, Richo, Japan, tried to transship toner cartridges
collected in Hong Kong to Japan for recycling; however it abandoned the
program due to the enormous time required and costs incurred at customs
(Kojima, 2005).
Market Factors
As highlighted in Rahman and Subramanian (2012), many past studies, in-
cluding Teunter and van der Laan (2002), Ravi et al. (2005) and Guide Jr.
and Van Wassenhove (2009), explicitly mention the importance of market fac-
tors for implementing reverse supply chain operations. Market factors that
can be considered include recycled material supply and demand and costs for
leachate-controlled landfills. Recently, competition for precious metals from
WEEE has become more intense due to tight metal markets associated with
economic growth in both India and China and tightened export controls for
precious metals. A growing number of countries, including the United States,
is recognizing the value of WEEE (The New York Times, 2010). In the U.S.,
“the House of Representatives approved a bill authorizing research to address
the supply of rare earths” (The New York Times, 2010). Indeed, the high
density of precious metals included in cell phones attracts the attention of
relevant recycling parties.
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Technical Factors
Technical factors include the percentage of precious and hazardous mate-
rials contained in products and the percentage of precious materials that
smelters can extract from collected WEEE. Firms reduce or eliminate haz-
ardous materials contained in products due to environmental concerns (e.g.,
Murphy and Poist (2003)) or consumer demand (e.g., Kapetanopoulou and
Tagaras, 2011). Firms also seek to improve sorting precision of returned
products and/or recycling technologies due to incentives (e.g., Ferguson and
Toktay, 2006) or economic reasons (e.g., Ravi et al., 2005). In order to se-
cure adequate amounts of WEEE for recycling in Japan, some smelters have
developed new smelter technologies that allow them to extract rare metals
from WEEE that rival smelters cannot extract. Consequently, they achieve
a 99% recycling rate and can purchase WEEE for a higher price from South
East Asia (The Nikkei American Edition, 2008a).
3 Literature Overview
A fast growing research stream investigates WEEE management and recy-
cling systems. Sodhi and Reimer (2001) developed optimization models for
each member of an electronics recycling network and obtained results using
data from the U.S. recycling industry. In their models, prices and trans-
portation costs are exogenously defined, and competition between members
is ignored. Nagurney and Toyasaki (2005) formulated a multitiered e-cycling
network model using a variational inequality formulation in a Cournot oligop-
sony game. The authors focused on formulating the relationship between
different members of the e-cycling network. The formulation provides the en-
dogenous equilibrium prices and material flows between tiers. Hammond and
Beullens (2007) developed a closed-loop supply chain model for WEEE in a
Cournot pricing game with perfect information. They numerically found that
minimum recovery targets stimulated manufacturers’ reverse chain activities.
Based on this work, Yang et al. (2009) developed a closed-loop supply chain
network model that included raw material suppliers, manufacturers, retail-
ers, consumers and recovery centers. Qiang et al. (2013) include demand and
yield uncertainty in their closed-loop supply chain network model with com-
petition and distribution channel investments. Rahman and Subramanian
(2012) identified eight factors for end-of-life computer recycling operations
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and investigated interactions among these factors through a cognition map-
ping process applied at two private recycling companies in Australia.
Our model differs from previous models in the structure of the network
and the behavior of the decision-makers. While Nagurney and Toyasaki
(2005) assume that cost-minimizing consumers have to dispose all the waste,
our research explicitly considers that consumers have the option of keeping
some of the waste. Furthermore, recyclers can decide between selling the
waste to local smelters or to offshore smelters. This setting allows us to
study the impact of different policies on the total amount of waste that is
collected and processed within a country.
In order to also represent the important issue of technology investments,
our model explicitly considers impacts of technical factors, specifically, sort-
ing precision and the percent of precious materials that can be extracted
from WEEE, on the amount of collected and legally or illegally discarded
WEEE. Furthermore, this paper explicitly addresses the issue of hazardous
waste, illegal dumping as well as the risk of detection. Studies specifically
dealing with risks related to hazardous waste reverse logistics are rare. Hu
et al. (2002) presented a cost-minimization model for a multi-time-step and
multi-type hazardous waste reverse logistics system. Sheu (2008) applied
linear multi-objective optimization models to maximize the profit of forward
flows and to minimize costs and risks in the reverse flows. In this paper, a
penalty associated with disposing a unit of the electronic waste in the land-
fill is imposed with a certain probability if a source is audited and found in
violation of the regulation by the regulator.
4 The Model
In this section, we develop the multitiered e-cycling network model with
illegal dumping and offshoring depicted in graphical form in Figure 2. The
network consists of four tiers of nodes. Consider m sources of electronic
waste as represented by the top tier of nodes in Figure 2 (h = 1, ..,m); n
recyclers of electronic waste, as depicted by the second tier of nodes (i =
1, ..., n); o smelters as depicted by the third tier of nodes (j = 1, ..., o), and p
demand markets for precious materials shown in the fourth tier (j = 1, ..., p).
In addition, let node n + 1 at the second tier denote illegal dumping by
consumers, let node o + 1 at the third tier denote offshoring of recycling
activities by recyclers who send e-waste outside the country and let node p+1
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at the fourth tier denote disposal of waste in leachate-controlled landfills by
smelters. Here, we follow the common network structure that can be found
1
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Figure 2: The 4-tiered e-cycling network with sources, recyclers, smelters,
and demand markets
in Sodhi and Reimer (2001). Recyclers collect, sort and disassemble e-waste
that they get from sources. We assume that recyclers disassemble e-waste into
a certain number of components v = 1, ..., l; v = l + 1 indicates components
that cannot be classified (residual waste). Smelters buy these components,
extract precious materials and sell them to demand markets. The remaining
parts of the e-waste are categorized as hazardous and residual waste and are
disposed at a legal landfill.
The endogenous and exogenous variables (Tables 1 and 2, respectively)
and the functions for the model (Table 3) are presented subsequently. We
assume that the functions for the aversion to product returns, the disutility
of holding waste, the illegal dumping penalty, all transportation, transac-
tion, collection, sorting, disassembly, processing and waste disposal costs are
continuously differentiable. Furthermore, we require the cost functions for
recyclers and smelters as well as recyclers’ offshoring costs to be continuously
differentiable and convex. The demand functions for precious materials on
the fourth tier of our network are linearly decreasing in prices.
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Material flows
qhi e-waste flow from source h to i
qijv flow of components of type v from recycler i to smelter
j
qi(o+1)v e-waste flow of components of type v from recycler i
to offshore smelter o+ 1
qjk flow of precious components from smelter j to demand
market k
Qh ∈ R(n+1)+ vector of e-waste flows from source h to the second tier
nodes, qhi, ∀i
Qi ∈ Rm+ vector of e-waste flows from all sources to recycler i,
qhi, ∀h
Qi ∈ R(o+1)×(l+1)+ vector of e-waste flows from recycler i to the third tier
nodes
Qj ∈ Rn×(l+1)+ vector of e-waste flows from all recyclers to a smelter
j, qijv, ∀i and ∀v
Qj ∈ Rp+ vector of e-waste flows from smelter j to the fourth
tier nodes
Qk ∈ Ro+ vector of e-waste flows from all smelters to a fourth
tier node k, qjk , ∀j
Prices
λh opportunity cost of source h for dealing with e-waste
ρ1hi incentive (price) source h receives from (pays to) recy-
cler i
ρ2ijv incentive (price) recycler i receives from (pays to)
smelter j for components of type v
ρ3jk price for precious materials sold to demand market k
by smelter j
ρ4k material price (of precious materials) at demand mar-
ket k
ρ4 ∈ Rp+ vector of demand market prices
Lagrange
multipliers
γ1iv Lagrange multiplier for equation (6), ∀v
γ2iv Lagrange multiplier for equation (7), ∀v
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γ3i(l+1) Lagrange multiplier for equation (8)
γ4i Lagrange multiplier for equation (9)
ηj Lagrange multiplier for equation (13)
Table 1: Endogenous variables of the model
S¯h volume of e-waste possessed by source h
pi1h probability that source h’s illegal dumping is discov-
ered
ρ¯2(o+1) unit price for e-waste at off-shore smelter o+ 1
αhv fraction of components of type v that is included in
e-waste from h
βprec.v fraction of precious materials included in component
of type v
βhaz.v fraction of hazardous materials included in component
of type v
δi sorting precision of recycler i
δj extraction precision of smelter j; δj = 1 means that
smelter j can extract 100% of precious materials that
are included in e-waste
Mi minimum collection quantity of recycler i
Table 2: Model parameters
ah(Qh) source h’s aversion to product return
εh(S¯h, Qh) disutility level of source h for holding waste
chi(qhi) transportation costs faced by source h and option i
ρ¯1h(qh(n+1)) illegal dumping penalty charged to source h if detected
fi(Qi) recycler i’s collection, sorting and disassembly costs
fj(Q
j, Qj) smelter j’s transportation and processing costs
ckj(qjk) transaction costs faced by demand market k with
smelter j
dk(ρ4k) demand at market k
ρj(p+1)(Q
j, Qj) total waste disposal costs for smelter j at the legal
landfill
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Table 3: Functions used within the model
Sources’ Behavior
The sources possess a given volume of e-waste. The assumption of a given
volume of e-waste enables us to highlight the impacts of legislative, market,
and technical factors on e-waste flows. The waste that each source holds
differs with respect to the percentage of components of type v included, αhv.
Sources have the option of either keeping the waste or of disposing it legally
or illegally. Legal and illegal disposal of waste is associated with transporta-
tion costs, which include, for example, costs associated with traveling to the
collection center or landfill. Sources of waste charge or pay each recycler i
a price per unit of e-waste, where the price is an endogenous variable in the
model. The sources’ e-waste flow is controlled by their two incompatible feel-
ings towards their products (aversion to returning products (Hammond and
Beullens, 2007) and disutility of holding waste) and economic incentives (in-
centives from recyclers, penalties for illegal dumping and transaction costs).
Aversion to returning products might be caused by sentimental value associ-
ated with the product. The disutility of holding, “holding costs”, represents
the costs for holding on to end-of life/end-of use products. Holding costs
provide an incentive to discard the product even if discarding activities are
associated with costs, as it is frequently the case for the material recycling
of products.
The relationship between the two contradictory feelings depends on a
product’s bulkiness, the amount, and its emotional value. If an end-of-life
product is relatively small (e.g. cell phones), the former might be stronger
than the latter. The latter, however, might be stronger than the former if a
product is very bulky (e.g. refrigerators). The specific relationship of the two
feelings is unique for each consumer and each product class. For example,
the amount of collected TV sets, air conditioners, washing machines, and
refrigerators increased by 50% between 2001 and 2005 in Japan while the
amount of collected cell phones decreased by 50% from 2000 through 2006
(The Nikkei American Edition, 2008b). Cell phones are characterized by
their small size as well as high sentimental value if personal information, for
example, pictures are stored. The holding cost function enables the model
to consider impacts of different types of products in terms of size on sources’
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decision making. Furthermore, by considering the disutility of holding prod-
ucts, the model can approximate sources’ intertemporal decision making by
accounting for the costs that accrue over several time periods. Under a series
of e-waste recycling regulations, the sources of e-waste are prohibited from
dumping waste because it contains hazardous materials. However, sources’
illegal dumping is a serious problem. For example, the amount of illegal e-
waste dumping increased by 44% in 2003 as compared to before the SHAR
law came into force in 2001. Our model reflects this reality, allows for illegal
dumping of waste by sources, and includes associated penalties.
Various structures of the audit probability were proposed by many re-
searchers (van Egteren and Weber, 1996, and the references therein). Malik
(1990) assumed that the firm’s subjective probability of being audited is a
function of the level of emissions, the level of permits, and a vector of un-
specified exogenous audit parameters set by the enforcement agency. Keeler
(1991) and van Egteren and Weber (1996) proposed an audit probability
function that was dependent on the violation level. Mrozek (1995) assumed
that the audit probability might depend on the initial allocation of permits.
In this paper, the penalty associated with disposing a unit of the electronic
waste in the landfill is monotone increasing in the amount of waste dumped.
Sources’ (End-users’) Equilibrium Conditions
The equilibrium conditions reflect sources’ behavior as described in the pre-
vious section. For all sources: h;h = 1, . . . ,m, in equilibrium, one must have
that:
S¯h
{
=
∑n+1
i=1 q
∗
hi, if λ
∗
h > 0
≥∑n+1i=1 q∗hi, if λ∗h = 0; (1)
ah(Q
∗
h) + chi(q
∗
hi)− εh(S¯h, Q∗h) + λ∗h
{
= ρ∗1hi, if q
∗
hi > 0 for all i = 1...n
≥ ρ∗1hi, if q∗hi = 0 for all i = 1...n;
(2)
ah(Q
∗
h)+ch(n+1)(q
∗
h(n+1))− εh(S¯h, Q∗h)
+ λ∗h
{
= −pi1hρ¯1h(q∗h(n+1)), if q∗hi > 0 for i = n+ 1
≥ −pi1hρ¯1h(q∗h(n+1)), if q∗hi = 0 for i = n+ 1.
(3)
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Condition (1) states that the equilibrium shadow price λ∗h is zero if the
total amount of product available is larger than the amount that is illegally
dumped and sent to recyclers. If the amount that is available and the amount
transshipped are equal, then λ∗h represents the opportunity cost for the dif-
ferent ways of dealing with the waste. Condition (2) states that source h will
provide her end-of-life products to recycler i unless the consumer’s aversion
of returning the products plus the transaction costs (from the perspective of
the sources) plus the opportunity cost for treating the waste minus disutility
associated with holding the waste exceeds the incentive set by the recycler for
obtaining the product. Condition (3), on the other hand, states that source
h will illegally dump her end-of-life products unless the expected penalty of
illegal dumping exceeds her disutility associated with holding the waste mi-
nus the aversion of returning the product minus transaction costs minus the
opportunity cost for treating the waste.
As it is the case for the analogous conditions in the other sections, these
conditions correspond to an extension of the well-known spatial price equi-
librium conditions (Samuelson, 1952; Takayama and Judge, 1971; Nagurney,
1999; Hammond and Beullens, 2007, and the references therein) and have
also been utilized in a variety of supply chain network equilibrium problems
(Nagurney, 2006). Clearly (see e.g., Nagurney, 1999), conditions (1), (2), and
(3) can be formulated as a variational inequality problem given by:
determine (q∗hi, λ
∗
h) ∈ K1, for h = 1, . . . ,m; i = 1, . . . , n+ 1, such that
m∑
h=1
n∑
i=1
[ah(Q
∗
h)− εh(S¯h, Q∗h) + chi(q∗hi)− ρ∗1hi + λ∗h]× [qhi − q∗hi]
+
m∑
h=1
[ah(Q
∗
h)− εh(S¯h, Q∗h) + ch(n+1)(q∗h(n+1)) + pi1hρ¯1h(q∗h(n+1)) + λ∗h]× [qh(n+1) − q∗h(n+1)]
+
m∑
h=1
[S¯h −
n+1∑
i=1
q∗hi]× [λh − λ∗h] ≥ 0, ∀(qhi, λh) ∈ K1,
(4)
where K1 ≡ {(qhi, λh)|(qhi, λh) ≥ 0, ∀h, i}.
Recyclers’ Behavior
Following reports of companies that collect end-of-life e-wastes and previous
related research (e.g., Sodhi and Reimer, 2001; Chatterjee and Kumar, 2009),
recyclers in our model are entities that accept e-waste from end-users and who
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segregate and disassemble the waste. According to Sodhi and Reimer (2001),
the disassembly of waste can enhance its value in three ways: 1. through
the sale of components leads to higher revenue than material recovery; 2.
through additional recoverable material from disassembled subassemblies;
and 3. through separated subassemblies being sent to different smelters for
a more profitable material recovery than the entire e-waste being sent to a
single smelter (e.g. gold content in the entire PC is 0.005%; however, 0.05%
gold content in the motherboard). For example, a cell-phone recycler in
Japan disassembles collected phones into 12-18 components and sends them
separately based on their materials.
In this model, recyclers collect e-waste from sources and pay or charge
them a price per unit of e-waste. The waste is disassembled and sorted ac-
cording to the components included. The recyclers can decide to send part or
all of the e-waste outside of the country and, thereby, offshore extraction ac-
tivities of precious materials. Waste that is offshored usually costs a uniform
price, independent of the components included (c.f., Sandner and Schilling,
2010).
Recyclers’ Optimization Problems
Recyclers’ objective is to maximize profit. Revenue thereby incurred is for
selling components to smelters and for the export to offshore markets. Costs
arise for collection, sorting and disassembly of e-waste and possibly from in-
centives recyclers have to pay to sources in order to get the e-waste. Let ρ∗2ijv
denote the endogenously determined price charged by recycler i to smelter
j for component v. A positive ρ∗2ijv implies that recycler i receives money
from smelter j for transshipping component v, a negative price implies that
recycler i needs to pay money to smelter j. We can express the criterion of
profit maximization for recycler i as:
max
Qi, Qi
o∑
j=1
l+1∑
v=1
(ρ∗2ijv · qijv) +
l+1∑
v=1
ρ¯2(o+1) · qi(o+1)v−
m∑
h=1
(ρ∗1hi · qhi)− fi(Qi) (5)
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subject to:
o+1∑
j=1
qijv ≥ δi
m∑
h=1
(αhv · qhi), ∀v ∈ {1, . . . , l}, (6)
o+1∑
j=1
qijv ≤ δi
m∑
h=1
(αhv · qhi), ∀v ∈ {1, . . . , l}, (7)
o+1∑
j=1
qij(l+1) ≥
m∑
h=1
qhi −
l∑
v=1
o+1∑
j=1
qijv, (8)
m∑
h=1
qhi ≥Mi, (9)
qhi ≥ 0, qijv ≥ 0, h = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , o+ 1; v = 1, . . . , l + 1. (10)
The constraints reflect recycler i’s sorting possibilities δi, where δi = 0.5,
for example, means that recycler i can correctly assign half of the disassem-
bled e-waste to components of type v. δi
∑m
h=1(αhv · qhi) is the amount of
component v that recycler i received from all sources h and correctly clas-
sified. Constraints (6) and (7) indicate that recyclers need to transfer these
components to the next tier but that they cannot transfer more components
than they have. Constraint (8) covers all components that cannot be clas-
sified v = l + 1 (residual waste) and makes sure that recyclers transfer all
residual waste to the next tier. Residual waste achieves a negative price
(recyclers need to pay for its treatment), therefore, a constraint that makes
sure that recyclers do not transfer more residual waste than they get is not
necessary.
The WEEE legislation adopted by the EU requires a minimum collection
quantity of WEEE of 4 kg per person a year. Other countries introduced
similar legislation. In order to shed more light on the impact of minimum
collection quantities, constraint (9) ensures a minimum amount of Mi that
is transshipped from sources h to recycler i.
The equilibrium conditions for all recyclers i, i = 1, . . . , n, can be formu-
lated as a variational inequality problem as follows: determine (q∗hi, q
∗
ijv, γ
1∗
iv ,
γ2∗iv , γ
3∗
i(l+1), γ
4∗
i ) ∈ K2 for h = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , o+ 1; v = 1, . . . , l+ 1 such
that
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m∑
h=1
n∑
i=1
[
ρ∗1hi +
l∑
v=1
(γ1∗iv αhvδi− γ2∗iv αhvδi) + γ3∗i(l+1) − γ4∗i
]
× [qhi − q∗hi]
+
n∑
i=1
o∑
j=1
l∑
v=1
[
−ρ∗2ijv +
∂fi(Q
∗
i )
∂qijv
− γ1∗iv + γ2∗iv − γ3∗i(l+1)
]
× [qijv − q∗ijv]
+
n∑
i=1
o∑
j=1
[
−ρ∗2ij(l+1) +
∂fi(Q
∗
i )
∂qij(l+1)
− γ3∗i(l+1)
]
× [qij(l+1) − q∗ij(l+1)]
+
n∑
i=1
l∑
v=1
[
−ρ¯2(o+1) + ∂fi(Q
∗
i )
∂qi(o+1)v
− γ1∗iv + γ2∗iv − γ3∗i(l+1)
]
× [qi(o+1)v − q∗i(o+1)v]
+
n∑
i=1
[
−ρ¯2(o+1) + ∂fi(Q
∗
i )
∂qi(o+1)(l+1)
− γ3∗i(l+1)
]
× [qi(o+1)(l+1) − q∗i(o+1)(l+1)]
+
n∑
i=1
l∑
v=1
[
o+1∑
j=1
q∗ijv − δi
m∑
h=1
(αhv · q∗hi)
]
× [γ1iv − γ1∗iv ]
+
n∑
i=1
l∑
v=1
[
δi
m∑
h=1
(αhv · q∗hi)−
o+1∑
j=1
q∗ijv
]
× [γ2iv − γ2∗iv ]
+
n∑
i=1
[
o+1∑
j=1
q∗ij(l+1) −
m∑
h=1
q∗hi +
o+1∑
j=1
l∑
v=1
q∗ijv
]
× [γ3i(l+1) − γ3∗i(l+1)]
+
n∑
i=1
[
m∑
h=1
qhi −Mi
]
× [γ4i − γ4∗i ] ≥ 0,
∀(qhi, qijv, γ1iv, γ2iv, γ3i(l+1), γ4i ) ∈ K2,
(11)
where
K2 ≡ {(qhi, qijv, γ1iv, γ2iv, γ3i(l+1), γ4i )|(qhi, qijv, γ1iv, γ2iv, γ3i(l+1), γ4i ) ≥ 0,∀h, i, j, v}.
Smelters’ Behavior
Smelters in our model are entities that recover metal and nonmetal materi-
als from disassembled parts of products. As Chatterjee and Kumar (2009)
explains, this process includes pulverization, valuation, and extraction. The
recovery rate varies depending on technologies, knowledge, and economic vi-
abilities. In developing countries, the recovery yield of precious metals is
very poor due to unskilled operations (Chatterjee and Kumar, 2009); in de-
veloped countries, more than 90%, but less than 100%, of recovery rates are
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achieved in silver, palladium, and gold (Park and Fray, 2009). However, re-
cycling units in developed countries face shortages of collected quantities and
thereby operations become economically non-viable (Chatterjee and Kumar,
2009). Furthermore, recovery technologies of rare metals and rare earths still
are immature, so that most of them are still included in residue that is dis-
carded to landfills. The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
therefore encourages recycling units to develop economically viable technolo-
gies for rare metal extraction (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
Japan and Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation, 2012). How-
ever, some smelters have successfully implemented extraction technologies
and logistics systems for rare metals and rare earth, so that they establish a
superior position in the market (The Nikkei American Edition, 2008a).
As noted earlier, the disposal of WEEE is a major problem due to the
fact that WEEE includes hazardous materials. Due to the toxicity of these
materials, WEEE has to be treated at smelters with appropriate treatment
facilities, and the residuals after treatment must be disposed of in leachate-
controlled landfills. In this model, smelters acquire waste from recyclers and
pay/receive a price for the waste. The costs that they incur for processing
the waste depend on the amount of waste that they receive and treat. Haz-
ardous materials require specific treatment due to their toxicity and, there-
fore, smelters incur additional costs for dealing with hazardous materials.
Smelters extract and sell precious materials from the waste. Smelters might
not be able to extract precious materials completely from electronic waste.
Depending on the technology used in the process, the percentage of precious
materials that can be taken out of the waste varies. Smelters discard residual
waste at landfills. Each smelter pays a price per unit of waste disposed of at
the landfill, depending on the type of material.
Smelters’ Optimization Problems
Smelters’ revenue arises from selling precious materials to demand markets.
They incur costs for buying e-waste from recyclers, for disposal of e-waste at
legal landfills and for processing the waste. Of course, prices for components
v differ due to their differing material composition, especially, the different
percentages of precious materials included, βprec.v . By denoting ρ
∗
3jk as the
(endogenous) price that smelter j charges to demand market k for precious
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materials, a smelter j’s optimization problem is given by:
max
Qj , Qj
p∑
k=1
(ρ∗3jk · qjk)−
n∑
i=1
l+1∑
v=1
ρ∗2ijv · qijv− ρj(p+1)(Qj, Qj)− fj(Qj, Qj) (12)
subject to:
p∑
k=1
qjk ≤ δj
l+1∑
v=1
(βprec.v
n∑
i=1
qijv), (13)
qijv ≥ 0, qjk ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n; k = 1, . . . , p; v = 1, . . . , l + 1. (14)
Constraint (13) guarantees that smelters do not sell more precious materials
than they extract from all components v that they received from all sources
i. The optimization conditions for all smelters j can be formulated as a
variational inequality problem as follows: determine (q∗ijv, q
∗
jk, η
∗
j ) ∈ K3 for
i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , o; k = 1, . . . , p; v = 1, . . . , l + 1, such that
l+1∑
v=1
n∑
i=1
o∑
j=1
[
∂ρj(p+1)(Q
j∗, Q∗j)
∂qijv
+
∂fj(Q
j∗, Q∗j)
∂qijv
+ ρ∗2ijv − ηjβprecv δj
]
× [qijv − q∗ijv]
+
o∑
j=1
p∑
k=1
[
−ρ∗3jk +
∂ρj(p+1)(Q
j∗, Q∗j)
∂qjk
+
∂fj(Q
j∗, Q∗j)
∂qjk
+ η∗j
]
× [qjk − q∗jk]
+
o∑
j=1
[
δj
l+1∑
v=1
βprecv
n∑
i=1
q∗ijv −
p∑
k=1
q∗jk
]
× [ηj − η∗j ] ≥ 0,
(15)
∀(qijv, qjk, ηj) ∈ K3, where K3 ≡
{(qijv, qjk, ηj)|(qijv, qjk, ηj) ≥ 0,∀i, j, v, k}.
Demand Market Behavior
Consumers buy precious materials from smelters. Consumers face transac-
tion costs for their transaction with smelters that depend on the volume of
shipment/transaction between the smelter and the demand market pair.
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The Demand Market Equilibrium Conditions
The equilibrium conditions associated with the precious material shipments
from smelters to precious material markets take on the following form: for
any smelter with associated demand market k of precious materials where
k = 1, ..., p:
dk(ρ
∗
4k)

=
o∑
j=1
q∗jk, if ρ
∗
4k > 0
≤
o∑
j=1
q∗jk, if ρ
∗
4k = 0;
(16)
ρ∗3jk + ckj(q
∗
jk)
{
= ρ∗4k, if q
∗
jk > 0
≥ ρ∗4k, if q∗jk = 0. (17)
Condition (16) states that if the price the consumers are willing to pay for
the precious materials at demand market k, ρ∗4k, is positive, then the quantity
consumed at the demand market is precisely equal to the demand. Otherwise,
the availability of precious materials at demand market k may exceed its
demand. Condition (17) states that consumers at demand market k will
purchase precious materials from smelter j, if the price charged by the smelter
for the product, ρ∗3jk, plus the transaction costs (from the perspective of the
consumers) do not exceed the price that consumers are willing to pay for
precious materials. Clearly, (see e.g., Nagurney, 1999) conditions (16) and
(17) must hold for all demand markets k; k = 1, . . . , p, and can be formulated
as a variational inequality problem, given by:
determine (q∗jk, ρ
∗
4k) ∈ K4, for j = 1, . . . , o; k = 1, . . . , p, such that
p∑
k=1
[
o∑
j=1
q∗jk − dk(ρ∗4k)
]
× [ρ4k − ρ∗4k]
+
o∑
j=1
p∑
k=1
[
ρ∗3jk + ckj(q
∗
jk)− ρ∗4k
]× [qjk − q∗jk] ≥ 0,
(18)
∀(qjk, ρ4k) ∈ K4, where
K4 ≡ {(qjk, ρ4k)|(qjk, ρ4k) ≥ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . , o; k = 1, . . . , p}.
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The Equilibrium Conditions of the Network:
In equilibrium, the equilibrium conditions for sources and demand markets
as well the optimality conditions for recyclers and smelters must hold si-
multaneously and all the constraints must be satisfied (see e.g., Nagurney,
2006).
Definition 1. Network Equilibrium
The equilibrium state of the e-waste network is one where the flows between
the tiers of the network coincide and the shipments and prices satisfy the
sum of the optimality conditions (11) and (15) as well as the equilibrium
conditions (4) and (18).
Theorem 2. Variational Inequality Formulation
The e-waste network is in equilibrium according to Definition 1, if and only if
it satisfies the variational inequality problem: Determine q∗hi, q
∗
ijv, λ
∗
h, ρ
∗
4k, q
∗
jk,
γ1∗iv , γ
2∗
iv , γ
3∗
i(l+1), γ
4∗
i , η
∗
j ∈ K5 ∀ h = 1, . . . ,m; i = 1, . . . , n+1; j = 1, . . . , o+1;
k = 1, . . . , p; v = 1, . . . , l + 1, such that:
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m∑
h=1
n∑
i=1
[
ah(Q
∗
h)− εh(S¯h, Q∗h) + chi(q∗hi)
+
l∑
v=1
(γ1∗iv αhvδi − γ2∗iv αhvδi) + γ3∗i(l+1) − γ4∗i + λ∗h
]
× [qhi − q∗hi]
+
m∑
h=1
[
ah(Q
∗
h)− εh(S¯h, Q∗h) + ch(n+1)(q∗h(n+1)) + pi1hρ¯1h(q∗h(n+1)) + λ∗h
]× [qh(n+1) − q∗h(n+1)]
+
n∑
i=1
o∑
j=1
l∑
v=1
[
∂ρj(p+1)(Q
j∗, Q∗j)
∂qijv
+
∂fj(Q
j∗, Q∗j)
∂qijv
+
∂fi(Q
∗
i )
∂qijv
−γ1∗iv + γ2∗iv − γ3∗i(l+1) − ηjβprecv δj
]× [qijv − q∗ijv]
+
n∑
i=1
o∑
j=1
[
∂ρj(p+1)(Q
j∗, Q∗j)
∂qij(l+1)
+
∂fj(Q
j∗, Q∗j)
∂qij(l+1)
+
∂fi(Q
∗
i )
∂qij(l+1)
− γ3∗i(l+1) − ηjβprec(l+1)δj
]
× [qij(l+1) − q∗ij(l+1)]
n∑
i=1
l∑
v=1
[
−ρ¯2(o+1) + ∂fi(Q
∗
i )
∂qi(o+1)v
− γ1∗iv + γ2∗iv − γ3∗i(l+1)
]
× [qi(o+1)v − q∗i(o+1)v]
+
n∑
i=1
[
−ρ¯2(o+1) + ∂fi(Q
∗
i )
∂qi(o+1)(l+1)
− γ3∗i(l+1)
]
× [qi(o+1)(l+1) − q∗i(o+1)(l+1)]
+
o∑
j=1
p∑
k=1
[
∂ρj(p+1)(Q
j∗, Q∗j)
∂qjk
+
∂fj(Q
j∗, Q∗j)
∂qjk
+ ckj(q
∗
jk)− ρ∗4k + η∗j
]
× [qjk − q∗jk]
+
p∑
k=1
[
o∑
j=1
q∗jk − dk(ρ∗4k)
]
× [ρ4k − ρ∗4k] +
n∑
i=1
l∑
v=1
[
o+1∑
j=1
q∗ijv − δi
m∑
h=1
(αhv · q∗hi)
]
× [γ1iv − γ1∗iv ]
+
n∑
i=1
l∑
v=1
[
δi
m∑
h=1
(αhv · q∗hi)−
o+1∑
j=1
q∗ijv
]
× [γ2iv − γ2∗iv ]
+
n∑
i=1
[
o+1∑
j=1
q∗ij(l+1) −
m∑
h=1
q∗hi +
o+1∑
j=1
l∑
v=1
q∗ijv
]
× [γ3i(l+1) − γ3∗i(l+1)]
+
n∑
i=1
[
m∑
h=1
qhi −Mi
]
× [γ4i − γ4∗i ] +
m∑
h=1
[S¯h −
n+1∑
i=1
q∗hi]× [λh − λ∗h]
+
o∑
j=1
[
δj
l+1∑
v=1
βprecv
n∑
i=1
q∗ijv −
p∑
k=1
q∗jk
]
× [ηj − η∗j ] ≥ 0,
(19)
∀ (qhi, qijv, λh, ρ4k, qjk, γ1iv, γ2iv, γ3i(l+1), γ4i , ηj) ∈ K5, where K5 ≡ {(qhi, qijv,
λh, ρ4k, qjk, γ
1
iv, γ
2
iv, γ
3
i(l+1), γ
4
i , ηj) |(qhi, qijv, λh, ρ4k, qjk, γ1iv, γ2iv, γ3i(l+1),
γ4i , ηj) ≥ 0, ∀h, i, j, k, v}.
Qualitative properties are provided in B.
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5 Numerical Simulation
This section highlights how the model developed in the previous sections can
be used to explore how market, technical, and legislative factors impact the
amount of waste that is collected, recycled, exported and legally or illegally
disposed of. The network for the numerical simulation consists of two sources
of electronic waste, four recyclers, two smelters, and one demand market (see
Figure 3). Sources either illegally dump their waste, hold on to it, or send
it to the recyclers. Recyclers can offshore the waste or send the components
v=1,2 and the residual waste v=3 to smelters. Smelters extract precious
materials and sell them to the demand market. They send the residual waste
to the legal landfill. The Euler method (Dupuis and Nagurney, 1993) was
implemented in Matlab and applied to compute the solutions. A description
1
1
2
1 2
1
Sources h
Recycler i
Smelter j
Demand Market k
Illegal Dumping
Offshore Market
Landfill
2 3 4 5
3
2
Figure 3: The 4-tiered e-cycling network assumed for the numerical simula-
tion
of the functions and parameters used for the numerical simulations can be
found in A. We assume that each tier has an identical set of functions.
By including four recyclers and two smelters, our model therefore considers
competition among recyclers and smelters in the recycling market.
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5.1 Influence of Market Factors
Prices for precious materials are influenced by global changes in supply and
demand for these materials and vary significantly. For example, the prices for
steel refined from scrap iron varied by the generated amount of scrap iron and
the demand for scrap iron of international as well as domestic blast furnace
and electric furnace steelmakers (Scrap Trading News, n.d.). This section
describes the impact of WEEE supply and demand for precious materials
on profits, waste flows and prices in the network. Our numerical examples
highlight that consumer behavior, the resulting supply for WEEE, and the
potential demand market size for precious materials strongly influence the
stakeholders in the WEEE recycling system.
One of the major concerns of many WEEE systems is whether or not
the supply of WEEE is sufficient to ensure sustainable operations. Pilot
studies and assessment for WEEE collection strategies have been conducted
in some municipalities, such as Massachusetts (Massachusetts Department
of Environmental Protection, 2000), Portland Metro (Cascadia Consulting
Group and e4 Partners, Inc., 2002), and Tokyo (Committee of Promotion
of Precious Metal Containing Product Collection, Tokyo Metropolitan Gov-
ernment, 2009). These studies highlighted the importance of the effective
design of collection systems. Although end-users’ end-of-use/-life product
return is influenced by collection strategies (Boyaci et al., 2009) and collec-
tion network designs (Aras and Aksen, 2008; Aras et al., 2008), our model
pays attention to the flow of WEEE in a given downstream network, rather
than to collection strategies and network design.
Our numerical example indicates that WEEE supply is strongly impacted
by sources’ sentiment towards holding waste. Increasing consumer aversion
to product returns (p1 = 0, 0.5, . . . , 2) reduces WEEE flows from sources, re-
duces recycled material flows to offshore markets, and reduces recyclers’ prof-
its. Increasing consumers’ holding costs for holding waste (p2 = 0, 1, . . . , 4)
has the opposite effect. These results highlight the importance of effective
collection designs and reflect problems of WEEE take-back schemes caused
by a low collection rate, for example, low collection rates of cell phones from
end-users in Japan (The Nikkei American Edition, 2008b).
Figure 4 provides a more detailed analysis of the impact of an increase of
the volume of e-waste possessed by source h, S
h
, on recyclers’ and smelters’
profits. Recyclers’ profits increase steadily due to reduced prices for resources
transshipped from sources of waste and increased offshoring activities. Prof-
23
its for smelters first increase, too. However, after a certain limit, smelters
cannot benefit further from increasing supply due to limitations with respect
to demand for precious materials. Hence, this example emphasizes the im-
portance of considering the interaction between the supply and demand side
for precious materials. Policies that increase WEEE supply without con-
sidering the demand side may not lead to the desired results for all market
participants.
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Figure 4: Impact of a variation of the demand market size on recycler i’s and
smelter j’s profit
An increase of the maximum demand (p11 = 1000, 2000, . . . , 5000) for
precious materials primarily increases prices at demand markets and reduces
quantities of offshored WEEE.
5.2 Technical factors
A series of WEEE laws require manufacturers of electronic equipments to
bear recycling costs. These laws can encourage manufacturers to reduce ma-
terial use and to improve the recyclability of products (Tojo, 2004). In devel-
oping environmentally friendly products, manufacturers change the type of
materials included in products. These initiatives sometimes lead to reduced
amounts of precious materials included in products as it was in the case of Hi-
tachi that developed a motor technology without using a rare-earth magnet
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(The Nikkei American Edition, 2010a). Furthermore, the recent rapid devel-
opment of miniaturization and lightweight technology reduces the amount of
metals used in electronic equipment. In this section, we analyze the impact
of technical factors on e-waste flows.
5.2.1 Extraction Possibilities
Advances in extraction technologies allow for higher quantities of precious
materials to be extracted from e-waste. Figure 5 highlights the influence of
these changes on offshoring. Low extraction precisions (δj < 0.3) impede
profitable smelting operations and hence cause a smelter’s output quantity
to be zero. When the extraction precision is increased, the quantities that
a smelter transships to demand markets increase rapidly. At first, this also
leads to higher quantities being transshipped between recyclers and smelters
(0.3 < δ < 0.6). When the extraction precision is increased even further
(δ > 0.6), we observe that due to market saturation the waste stream that is
brought to an offshore market rises. In our model, we observe the smallest
amount of offshored waste at an extraction precision of 60%.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
qi(o+1)1
δj
Figure 5: Effects of a variation in smelter j’s extraction possibilities on the
amount of offshoring
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5.2.2 Composition of WEEE
As Figure 6 indicates, the analysis of the impact of changes in composition
of WEEE leads to interesting and partly counterintuitive results. An in-
crease in the fraction of precious materials contained in components 1 and
2 increases quantities that are transshipped to demand markets. While this
effect continues, prices that demand markets have to pay in order to get
the precious materials decrease. For βprec.1 > 0.7 decreased prices will lower
the incentive for materials to remain in the network and will hence increase
quantities that are brought to offshore markets. As a decrease of precious
materials has a negative effect on smelters’ and recyclers’ profits, this result
sheds light on the negative impact of dematerialization of electronic products
on the sustainability of recycling systems.
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Figure 6: Impact of a variation of βprec1 on transshipped quantities
5.3 Legislative factors
The new directives and laws implemented in the EU, the US, Canada, and
Japan that were described in the introduction, highlight the important role
that legislative factors play in the development of recycling systems. Esti-
mating the impact of these regulations on stakeholders is a difficult task due
to the diversity and interrelatedness of their consequences. In Figure 7, we
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highlight how the model developed in this paper can be used to analyze the
impact of the probability that illegal dumping is detected. Recent attempts
to raise the probability of detection of illegal dumping (pi1h) use geographic
information systems (Tasaki et al., 2007) and satellite images (Ishihara et al.,
2002). When deciding on the methods for detecting illegal dumping, policy
makers need to consider the trade-offs in terms of costs and benefits.
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Figure 7: Variation of the probability that source h’s illegal dumping is
detected (pi1h) an its impact on illegally dumped e-waste.
In our numerical simulation, an increase of the detection probability pi1h
leads to a sharp decrease in quantities that are dumped illegally when the
probability is raised from 0% to 20%, while the decrease becomes smaller
when pi1h is raised further. Hence, it is especially beneficial to raise the
detection probability if it is currently below 20%.
6 Summary and Future Research
Reverse logistics systems for end-of-life products, especially, electrical and
electronic equipment waste (WEEE), are faced with many difficulties, in-
cluding illegal dumping of waste and low waste collection rates. Improving
the performance of reverse logistics systems requires a good understanding
of the main drivers of the logistics systems and their interaction.
In this paper, we develop a model that captures the influence of mar-
ket, technical, and legislative factors on the amount of products that are
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collected, recycled, and legally or illegally disposed of as well as the prices,
and costs associated with these processes. The numerical examples show
how this model can be used by policy makers to study the possible impli-
cations of new laws on sources of waste, smelters and demand markets, as
well as on the environmental performance of the system. As the results of
Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 show, recyclers’ offshoring option plays a buffer for
them against rapid-changing circumstances of WEEE collection and process-
ing. This indicates the importance of establishing not only domestic but also
international control regimes for WEEE flows. In this context, the e-waste
recycling regime in the European Union (EU) could be a reference exam-
ple. In the regime, EU Council Regulation 259/93/EEC is applied to wastes
transshipped within the EU while the Basel Convention is applied to haz-
ardous wastes into and out of the EU. Waste on the Green List of Wastes
(e.g. metal scraps and waste plastics, rubber, paper, wood) defined in the
Council Regulation 259/93/EEC are allowed to be transshipped within the
EU without restrictions. As a result, member states of the EU enjoy the ben-
efits of flexible trade of e-waste and its regional specialization among member
states (Kojima and Yoshida, 2005). Lastly, our numerical examples also in-
dicate the importance of adequate and secure demand for recycled materials.
Easily saturated demand for recycled materials would increase the amount
of offshoring. This could hinder prevalence of highly recyclable products as
results of Section 5.2.2 indicate.
The model shows certain limitations and can be extended in several di-
rections. Adding an additional tier of manufacturers would allow one to
address issues associated with closed-loop supply chains. One topic of spe-
cial interest in this context would be a detailed analysis of incentives and
effects of new product design. In our current model, we assume that the
levels of technical factors (i.e., component types, material types, sorting and
smelting precision) are parameters. However, in reality, manufacturers, re-
cyclers and smelters determine the level of sustainable product designs and
recycling technologies while taking into account WEEE inflow and economic
viability. In this case, the equivalence between equilibrium problems and vari-
ational inequality problems may not be achieved with a standard procedure
because non-linear constraints might be included. In this case, convexity
of the feasible region and conditions that satisfy a constraint qualification
need to be further explored. Furthermore, our model ignores the impacts of
WEEE take-back schemes. Opposing views exist concerning the desirability
of different schemes (Toyasaki et al., 2011). Comparing e-waste flows and
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stakeholders’ performance under different WEEE take-back schemes would
be an important practical issue for recycling system designers. Our research
also provides future research direction concerning the calculation method ap-
plied in the numerical examples section. The numerical experiments reveal
that variations of certain parameters had a great impact on the computation
time. More careful analysis of these phenomena from the perspective of algo-
rithms and functional forms used in the numerical examples is also subject to
future research. Finally, the insights gained in our numerical examples could
be tested using industry data. Cross-country studies could provide insights
concerning the influence of technologies while intertemporal studies could
provide insights concerning the effects of policies and raw material prices.
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A Parameters and functions used for the nu-
merical simulations
ah(Qh) = p1 ·
∑n+1
i=1 qhi source h’s aversion to products returns
εh(S¯h, Qh) = p2 · (Sh −
∑n+1
i=1 qhi) disutility level of source h for holding
e-waste
chi(qhi) = p3 · qhi transportation cost faced by source h
and option i
ch(n+1)(qhn+1) = 0 transaction cost for illegal dumping
(set to zero)
ρ¯1h(qh(n+1)) = p4 · qh(n+1) illegal dumping penalty charged to
source h when detected
fi(Qi) = [p5 · (
∑o+1
j=1
∑l+1
v=1 qijv)
p6 ]
+[p7 ·
∑o+1
j=1
∑l+1
v=1 qijv]
+[p8 ·
∑o
j=1
∑l+1
v=1 qijv]
recycler i’s cost function consists of
collection cost (first term), sorting cost
(second term) and dismantling cost
(third term); the term describing col-
lection costs is based on Atasu et al.
(2013)
fj(Q
j, Qj) = p3 ·
∑p
k=1 qjk
+p9 ·
∑n
i=1
∑l+1
v=1 qijv
+p10 ·
∑p
k=1 q
2
jk
smelter j’s costs consist of transporta-
tion costs of processed precious mate-
rials to demand market k (first term),
as well as processing costs of compo-
nents of type v (second term); the third
term reflects the fact that with an in-
crease of qjk costs will increase more
than proportionally due to the need of
processing less attractive materials
dk(ρ4k) = p11 − p12 · ρ4k demand function at demand market k
ckj(qjk) = p3 · qjk transaction costs of demand market k
associated with smelter j
ρj(p+1)(Q
j, Qj) = p13 ·∑n
i=1
∑l+1
v=1 β
haz.
v qijv + p14 ·
(
∑n
i=1
∑l+1
v=1 qijv −
∑p
k=1 qjk)
waste disposal cost consist of regular
disposal costs (second term) and ad-
ditional waste disposal costs for haz-
ardous materials (first term)
Table 4: Functional forms used for the numerical simu-
lations
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Parameter Description Values for
the simula-
tion
Base case value
Sh volume of e-waste pos-
sessed by each source h
{500, 1000,
1500, 2000}
Sh = 1321.9 (U.S.
Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, Office
of Solid Waste, 2008)
ρ2(o+1) unit price for e-waste at
off-shore smelter o+ 1
$100 (calculated based
on an argument in
The Seattle Times,
2006)
αh1 = αh2 fraction of components
of type 1 (2) in e-
waste that is trans-
shipped from source h
0.4
βprec.1
=
βprec.2
percentage of precious
materials contained in
component of type 1 (2)
{0.4, 0.5,
. . . , 1}
0.9
βprec.3 percentage of precious
materials in residual
waste (component l +
1 = 3)
0.3
βhaz.1
=
βhaz.2
percentage of haz-
ardous materials con-
tained in component of
type 1 (2)
0
βhaz.3 percentage of haz-
ardous materials
contained in residual
waste (component
l + 1 = 3)
0.2
δi recycler i’s sorting pre-
cision
0.8
δj smelter j’s extraction
precision
{0.1, 0.2,
. . . , 1}
0.8
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Mi recycler i’s minimum
collection quantity
0
pi1hi probability that source
h’s illegal dumping is
detected
{0, 0.2, 0.4,
0.6, 0.8, 1}
50%
p1 parameter in the func-
tion of source h’s aver-
sion to product returns
{0, 0.5, 1,
1.5, 2}
0.1
p2 parameter in the disu-
tility function of source
h
{0, 1, . . . , 4} 2
p3 unit transportation
costs for source h,
smelter j and demand
market k
17.2 (see Boon et al.,
2002)
p4 fine that has to be paid
when illegal dumping of
waste is detected
1,000
p5, p6 parameters for recycler
i’s collection cost
p5 = 0.007619, p6 =
1.572939 (see Atasu
et al., 2013)
p7 unit waste sorting costs
of one ton of WEEE
140 (see Boon et al.,
2002)
p8 costs to dismantle one
ton of WEEE
315 (see Boon et al.,
2002)
p9 unit costs to process
one ton of WEEE
640 (see Ontario Elec-
tronic Stewardship,
2008)
p10 parameter for smelter
j’s processing cost
0.1
p11 maximum demand at
demand market k
{1000, 2000,
. . . , 5000}
4000
p12 slope of the demand
function
1
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p13 additional unit disposal
costs of hazardous ma-
terials
167 (see Boon et al.,
2002)
p14 unit disposal costs of
non-hazardous materi-
als
33 (see Boon et al.,
2002)
Table 5: Parameters used for the numerical simulations
B Supplementary Material
For easy reference, variational inequality problem (18) can be rewritten in
standard variational inequality form (cf. Nagurney, 1999) as follows: deter-
mine X∗ ∈ K5 such that
〈F (X∗)T , X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K5. (20)
where the terms of F correspond to the terms preceding the multiplication
signs in inequality (19), and the term 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product in
N-dimensional Euclidean space.
Since the feasible set is not compact, one cannot derive existence simply
from the assumption of continuity of the function F (X). One can, neverthe-
less, impose a rather weak condition to guarantee existence of a solution to
variational inequality (19).
Lemma 3. Let Kb = {(qhi, qijv, λh, ρ4k, qjk, γ1iv, γ2iv, γ3i(l+1), γ4i , ηj)|0 ≤∑n+1
i=1 qhi ≤ S
h
; 0 ≤ ∑o+1j=1∑3v=1 qijv ≤ qhi; 0 ≤ ∑p+1k=1 qjk ≤ ∑ni=1∑3v=1 qijv;
0 ≤ λh ≤ b1; 0 ≤ ρ4k ≤ b2; 0 ≤ γ1iv ≤ b3; 0 ≤ γ2iv ≤ b4; 0 ≤ γ3i(l+1) ≤ b5;
0 ≤ γ4i ≤ b6; 0 ≤ ηj ≤ b7}, where b = (b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7) ≥ 0. Then
Kb is a bounded closed convex subset of K5. Thus, the following variational
inequality 〈F (Xb)T , X −Xb〉 ≥ 0, ∀Xb ∈ Kb, admits at least one solution
Xb ∈ Kb, from the standard theory of variational inequalities, since Kb is
compact and F is continuous.
The material flows qhi, qijv and qjk (∀h, i, j, v) are bounded since we assume a
fixed and finite amount of electronic waste Sh available at each source. We as-
sume that the demand function dk for all k is monotonically decreasing in ρ4k
for all k and demand for extracted precious material will be very low when the
33
demand price is high. Thus, we can set an upper bound on the demand price
ρ4k (Nagurney, 1999). As long as ρ3jk has an upper bound, the opportunity
cost for dealing with WEEE (λh), the shadow prices for the transshipment
of materials from the second to the third tier of our network and the shadow
price for the minimum collection quantity (γ1iv, γ
2
iv, γ
3
i(l+1), γ
4
i ) as well as
the shadow price of extracted precious materials (ηj) will never take on an
infinite value. Hence, it is possible to construct b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6 and b7. See
also the proof of existence for Proposition 1 in Nagurney and Zhao (1993).
Theorem 4. Summation
By solving variational inequality (19), we simultaneously solve sources’ and
demand markets’ equilibrium conditions (as given in equations (4) and (18))
as well as recyclers’ and smelters’ optimization problem (given in equations
(5)-(10) and (12)-(14)).
Proof. For specific realizations of the proof of Theorem 4 in the context of a
supply chain model see for example Nagurney et al. (2002).
Lemma 5. Strict Monotonicity
Suppose that all fi, fj, and ρj(p+1) are convex in Qi, Q
j and Qj ∀i, j, v, k
respectively, and at least one of the families of convex functions is a family
of strictly convex functions in Qi, Qj and Q
j. Furthermore, assume that ah,
−εh and chi are monotone increasing functions in Qh ∀h and at least one of
them is a strictly monotone increasing function in Qh. Finally assume that
ckj is a strictly monotone increasing and dk is a strictly monotone decreasing
function in (19). Then, the vector function F (X) that enters the variational
inequality (19) is strictly monotone for any X ′, X ′′ with both X ′ and X ′′ ∈ K,
that is,
〈(F (X ′)− F (X ′′))T , X ′ −X ′′〉 > 0, ∀X ′, X ′′ ∈ K. (21)
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Proof. After some simplifications, the left-hand side of inequality (19) is
m∑
h=1
n∑
i=1
[
ah(Q
′
h)− εh(S¯h, Q′h) + chi(q′hi)−
(
ah(Q
′′
h)− εh(S¯h, Q′′h) + chi(q′′hi)
)]× [q′hi − q′′hi]
+
m∑
h=1
[
ah(Q
′
h)− εh(S¯h, Q′h) + ch(n+1)(q′h(n+1)) + pi1hρ¯1h(q′h(n+1))
− (ah(Q′′h)− εh(S¯h, Q′′h) + ch(n+1)(q′′h(n+1)) + pi1hρ¯1h(q′′h(n+1)))]× [q′h(n+1) − q′′h(n+1)]
+
n∑
i=1
o∑
j=1
l∑
v=1
[
∂ρj(p+1)(Q
j′, Q′j)
∂qijv
+
∂fj(Q
j′, Q′j)
∂qijv
+
∂fi(Q
′
i)
∂qijv
−
(
∂ρj(p+1)(Q
j′′, Q′′j )
∂qijv
+
∂fj(Q
j′, Q′′j )
∂qijv
+
∂fi(Q
′′
i )
∂qijv
)]
× [q′ijv − q′′ijv]
+
n∑
i=1
o∑
j=1
[
∂ρj(p+1)(Q
j′, Q′j)
∂qij(l+1)
+
∂fj(Q
j′, Q′j)
∂qij(l+1)
+
∂fi(Q
′
i)
∂qij(l+1)
−
(
∂ρj(p+1)(Q
j′′, Q′′j )
∂qij(l+1)
+
∂fj(Q
j′′, Q′′j )
∂qij(l+1)
+
∂fi(Q
′′
i )
∂qij(l+1)
)]
× [q′ij(l+1) − q′′ij(l+1)]
+
n∑
i=1
l∑
v=1
[
∂fi(Q
′
i)
∂qi(o+1)v
− ∂fi(Q
′′
i )
∂qi(o+1)v
]
× [q′i(o+1)v − q′′i(o+1)v]
+
n∑
i=1
[
∂fi(Q
′
i)
∂qi(o+1)(l+1)
− ∂fi(Q
′′
i )
∂qi(o+1)(l+1)
]
× [q′i(o+1)(l+1) − q′′i(o+1)(l+1)]
+
o∑
j=1
p∑
k=1
[
∂ρj(p+1)(Q
j′, Q′j)
∂qjk
+
∂fj(Q
j′, Q′j)
∂qjk
+ ckj(q
′
jk)
−
(
∂ρj(p+1)(Q
j′′, Q′′j )
∂qjk
+
∂fj(Q
j′′, Q′′j )
∂qjk
+ ckj(q
′′
jk)
)]
× [q′jk − q′′jk]
+
p∑
k=1
[−dk(ρ′4k) + dk(ρ′′4k)]× [ρ′4k − ρ′′4k]
(22)
and the term (22) is positive so the conclusion follows.
Convergence results for the Euler method can be found in Dupuis and Nagur-
ney (1993) and Nagurney (2006) with specific realizations in Dhanda et al.
(1999).
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Theorem 6. Uniqueness
Assuming the conditions in Lemma 5, there must be a unique shipment pat-
tern and a unique generalized price vector satisfying the equilibrium condi-
tions of the e-waste network. In other words, if the variational inequality
(19) admits a solution, that should be the only solution in qhi, qijv, λh, ρ4k,
qjk, γ
1
iv, γ
2
iv, γ
3
i(l+1), γ
4
i , ηj ∀h, i, j, k, v.
Proof. Under the strict monotonicity result of Lemma 5, uniqueness follows
from the standard variational inequality theory (c.f. Kinderlehrer and Stam-
pacchia, 1980).
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